Nietzsche\u27s Debt to Kant\u27s Theory of the Beautiful in \u27Birth of Tragedy\u27 by Hill, R. Kevin
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Philosophy Faculty Publications and Presentations Philosophy
2007
Nietzsche's Debt to Kant's Theory of the Beautiful in 'Birth of
Tragedy'
R. Kevin Hill
Portland State University, hillrk@pdx.edu
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/phl_fac
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons
This Post-Print is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications and Presentations by an
authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Citation Details




Nietzsche’s Debt to Kant’s Theory of the Beautiful in Birth of Tragedy  
 
 Nietzsche describes Birth of Tragedy as a contribution to “the science of 
aesthetics” [BT 1]. In this paper, I will argue that a crucial influence on his emerging 
views was Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Nietzsche’s early aesthetic views are often 
attributed to some combination of Schopenhauer’s analyses of the plastic arts (inspiring 
Nietzsche’s conception of the Apollinian) and his analysis of music (inspiring 
Nietzsche’s conception of the Dionysian) along with Nietzsche’s own original insights 
into how these combine to form the tragic. As we shall see, the resources of 
Schopenhauer’s aesthetics were unavailable to Nietzsche due to epistemological 
commitments he had consistently made throughout the period from 1868 to 1874. By 
contrast, the Critique of Judgment, which Nietzsche first encountered in 1868, provided 
him with all the resources he needed to construct his conceptions of the Apollinian, the 
Dionysian and the tragic, without running afoul of Kantian epistemological constraints 
that he had adhered to throughout his early phase, constraints that Schopenhauer had 
violated. 
 Nietzsche copied out several passages from the Critique of Judgment in 1868, in a 
fragment titled “On Teleology.” There, he wrestled with the question of how the 
appearance of intelligent design is possible in Darwinian nature. On Kant’s view, nature 
is only knowable as mechanistic, but the meaning of functional claims involves at least a 
reference to the notion of intelligent design, and that reference takes us beyond the sphere 
of appearances. To avoid making biology depend upon claims about things-in-themselves 
(i. e., the intentions of an unknowable intelligent designer) Kant suggested that functional 
property claims are best understood as first person reports to the effect that no one could 
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resist thinking of a particular object but as if designed. Since it might well be true that no 
one could resist regarding an object but as if designed, without it actually being designed, 
Kantian restrictions of knowledge to appearances are preserved. 
 All the passages from the Critique of Judgment Nietzsche copied out in 1868 are 
from the “Critique of Teleological Judgment.” Had Nietzsche read the “Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment” before penning Birth of Tragedy as well? There are no copied 
quotations from the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” prior to 1887, though it is probable 
enough that Nietzsche had read it as early as 1883, where we see Nietzsche’s first 
objections to the notion of “disinterested pleasure.” 1  There is also a passage from the 
“Critique of Teleological Judgment” copied out in 1870-71 which, paraphrased, 
ultimately finds its way into the first page of Birth of Tragedy, thus at least suggesting 
that Nietzsche had linked the third Critique with his views in aesthetics. 2 
 Since there is no direct evidence of a reading of the “Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgment” before the writing of Birth of Tragedy, we must proceed indirectly. Briefly, 
Schopenhauer’s theory of the plastic arts depends upon his commitment to the existence 
of Platonic Forms which the spectator intuits by way of the art object. If Nietzsche’s 
conception of the Apollinian is indebted to Schopenhauer here, Nietzsche needs Platonic 
Forms and the capacity to intuit them. However, in all of Nietzsche’s writings from 1868 
                                                 
1“Since Kant, all talk of art, beauty, knowledge, wisdom is messed up [vermanscht] and soiled through the 
concept of ‘disinterestedness’” [KGW VII: 1, p. 251 (1883)]. This passage is the earliest objection to Kant’s 
aesthetics in the corpus; the first quotations from the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” appear in 1887 at 
KGW VIII: 1, p. 275 (1886-87). 
 
2KGW III: 3, p. 187 (1870-71). Nietzsche paraphrases Kant’s remarks concerning the reciprocal 
designedness of the sexes for reproduction (CJ, Ak. V, p. 425) in “On Teleology” without naming him at 
KGW I: 4, p. 575 (1868). The point that we must regard the sexes as if designed for each other is repeated 
at KGW III: 3, p. 157 (1870-71), with Kant named. Then at KGW III: 3, p. 187 (1870-71), Nietzsche 
compares the tragic as offspring of Apollo and Dionysus with natural procreation by two sexes, and again 
Kant is named. He repeats the comparison in BT 1, without reference to Kant. Here we have an unbroken 
textual chain from the Critique of Judgment to Birth of Tragedy. 
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to 1874, Nietzsche denies that there are Platonic Forms at all, and instead explains the 
genesis of the notion in terms reminiscent of Kant’s transcendental idealist explanation of 
the genesis of the appearance of biological form in the third Critique.  
 Schopenhauer had explained the appearance of intelligent design in the structure 
and functioning of organisms by appealing to the notion of Platonic Forms which 
somehow serve as organisms’ templates. As with mathematical Platonism, ontological 
inflation inspires epistemological mystery: Schopenhauer must assume that besides the 
various mental faculties he had already discussed in Book One of the World as Will and 
Representation, vol. 1, there is also a faculty for intuiting Platonic Forms. Having posited 
this faculty, Schopenhauer goes on to argue that this also explains our capacity to 
appreciate the plastic arts. 3 Beautiful works are beautiful because they participate in the 
Forms, and we come to know this through intuiting the Forms in them. Thus the truth of a 
judgment of taste, for Schopenhauer, rests on the correspondence of the judgment to 
aesthetic properties the art object itself possesses--it is an objectivist theory of taste. 
 But is this the basis for Nietzsche’s notion of the Apollinian? It cannot be if we 
interpret the notes of 1867-68, Birth of Tragedy in 1872 and Truth and Lie in 1873 as all 
of a piece, for throughout this period, Nietzsche rejects the idea of Platonic Forms. 4 In 
1868, we find Nietzsche claiming that the “organism [does] not belong to the thing in 
itself. The organism is form. If we abstract away the form, it is a multiplicity . . .  
                                                 
3For Schopenhauer’s aesthetics of the plastic arts, see WWR I, pp. 169-255. 
 
4 There are other compelling reasons for seeing the texts from 1868 to 1873 as of a piece. In 1868, 
Nietzsche argues in one set of notes that Schopenhauer’s argument for identifying the Kantian thing-in-
itself with the will is invalid, and that the Kantian position, that things-in-themselves are unknowable, is 
more nearly correct. Nietzsche also argues against the knowability of things-in-themselves in 1874 in On 
Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense. Did his views temporarily change in Birth of Tragedy? Not if we 
regard references to “the will” in Birth of Tragedy as merely Kantian reflective judgments, inspired by his 
earlier reading of the Critique of Judgment. 
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Organism as a product of our organization” [“On Teleology,” KGW I: 4, p. 558 (1868)]. 
“The concept of the whole however is our work. Here lies the source of the representation 
of ends. The concept of the whole does not lie in things, but in us. These unities which 
we call organisms are also only multiplicities. There are in reality no individuals, rather 
individuals and organisms are nothing but abstractions. Into these unities, made by us, we 
later transfer the idea of design” [“On Teleology,” KGW I: 4, p. 560 (1868)]. 
In On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, where we have Nietzsche’s clearest 
and most developed account of human subjectivity in his early writings, we also have an 
explicit repudiation of Platonic Forms.  The example he gives is a biological, not a 
mathematical one, thus suggesting that it is especially Schopenhauer’s Platonism he 
rejects. Instead, Nietzsche proposes, in perfect agreement with his Kant-inspired remarks 
on organic form in “On Teleology,” that the very existence of organic form in organic 
phenomena is projected into them by our minds. Truth and Lie goes beyond this, 
claiming that our failure to grasp the mind-dependence of organic form makes us 
hypostatize this form and fantasize that it could exist independent of our minds and the 
organic phenomena they produce. This fantasy we then baptize with the term “Platonic 
Form.”  
The concept “leaf” is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences 
and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects. This awakens the idea that, in 
addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the “leaf”: the original model 
according to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured, 
colored, curled and painted--but by incompetent hands, so that no specimen has 
turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, and faithful likeness of the original model . 
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. .  This means that the leaf is the cause of the leaves . . .  We obtain the concept, 
as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is 
acquainted with no forms and no concepts, and likewise no species, but only with 
an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable to us [KGW III: 2, p. 374 
(1873)/ TL 1, ellipses mine]. 
 Again, the consistency between the notes before and after Birth of Tragedy is 
striking. The implications of this account of Platonic Forms leave Schopenhauer’s entire 
analysis of the plastic arts in ruins. Surely Nietzsche could not have undercut the very 
possibility of a Schopenhauerian aesthetics with one hand and then helped himself to it 
with the other? Rather, we should assume that Nietzsche, like Schopenhauer, linked 
questions of aesthetic form to those of biological form. Since Nietzsche was committed to 
the notion that biological form is projected into experience, it is hard to imagine him 
having any other view but that aesthetic form is projected into experience as well. This is 
consistent with Nietzsche’s association of the Apollinian with dreaming [see BT 1]. In 
dreams images and their forms are freely produced by the imagination without even the 
constraint of data.  
 If this is correct, then it becomes very plausible to suppose that Nietzsche’s 
conception of the Apollinian further develops Kant’s conception of the beautiful. Kant 
had rejected the idea that aesthetic judgments could be objectively valid by conforming to 
objects which really possess aesthetic properties. But the contrasting subjectivist view, 
that aesthetic judgments were nothing more than subjective reports on the pleasure an 
individual happens to experience in the face of an object, seemed to undercut the 
possibility of standards of correctness for aesthetic judgments altogether. 
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 Nonetheless, Kant’s analysis begins with the simple fact that beauty elicits 
pleasure. Once other means of generating pleasure (satisfying preferences, discovering 
order in nature, obeying the moral law) have been removed, all that remains is the 
pleasurable effect objects have on us by virtue of the mind’s own transcendental 
structure: that we synthesize data under forms of intuition and the categories to produce 
experience and well-formed, meaningful judgments about it. But having this structure is a 
necessary condition of the possibility of experience. All experiencers who confront the 
objects in question, by virtue of being experiencers, will feel pleasure. This is because 
those who would be justified in dissenting would be only non-experiencers, and there 
cannot be dissenting non-experiencers. Therefore the judgment “this object, by virtue of 
its apparent design, necessarily produces pleasure in experiencers” is intersubjectively 
valid. And this is all that saying “this object is beautiful” comes to for Kant. Of course, 
this account of intersubjective validity depends crucially upon his account in the first 
Critique of the cognition of empirical objects. 
 Kant speaks of a “free play” between the understanding and the imagination, a 
“harmony of the faculties,” which gives rise to this aesthetic pleasure. This relationship 
resembles, but is significantly different from, the one that obtains when the understanding 
legislates to the imagination in ordinary human experience [CJ, Ak. V, p. 287]. We could 
say that aesthetic experience is analogous to a process of what Kant calls “recognition” 
gone wrong [CPR, A 103-110]. Each faculty is doing its job, but when it comes time to 
plug in the relevant expressions to complete the representation of the object, these 
expressions are missing. It is as if they were “on the tip of one’s tongue.” This does not 
mean that categorical elements or empirical concepts are entirely absent, but that they are 
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unable to play their normal role in generating complete experiences and thoughts. The 
process of experience-generation culminates in a penultimate stage in which the object is 
ready to be “recognized” and subsumed under some class. In ordinary cases, this happens 
readily enough, and the result is a “determinative judgment” about the object. In the 
aesthetic case, however, no class concept is readily available to subsume the object under. 
Metaphorically speaking, the mind scans the object, in response to intimations of 
patternedness in it, seeking its unifying design. This design, once grasped, should yield 
the concept under which the object is to be subsumed. But this attempt fails, with the 
consequence that judgment cannot be made. If that were all, then a faculty would have 
failed to discharge its function, and the result would be pain, not pleasure. However, the 
persistent intimation of unifying design, however elusive, holds the faculty of judgment 
in suspense, preventing it from abandoning the object as an uninterpretable chaos [CJ, 
Ak. V, pp. 220-21, 279]. Rather, the faculty of judgment reflects on its own state and 
judges that it can’t help but feel that there is a unifying design to the object.5 This 
judgment may very well be true, even if the mystery of the object persists. But in having 
produced the reflective judgment, the faculty of judgment has discharged its function of 
producing judgments, and thus in satisfying its aim, produces a feeling of pleasure [CJ, 
Ak. V, p. 218]. As in Kant’s theories generally, this “processing” takes place off stage, 
unconsciously. What we as experiencers are conscious of is finding an object beautiful 
                                                 
5This interpretation suggests that aesthetic experience happens by accident in cognitive contexts. But are 
we more likely to have an aesthetic experience after a day of frustration at the laboratory than when we are 
in the museum? While I do think that aesthetic experiences can take us by surprise in this way, another way 
to bring about aesthetic experience would be to take recognition “offline” by a gentle act of will. Refusal to 
recognize could be Kant’s version of what it is to adopt an aesthetic stance toward an object. Similarly, 
institutional settings like museums may be aesthetic settings, not by social fiat (as the post-Dadaist 
“institutional theory of art” would have it) but rather because these institutions uphold certain norms, 
perhaps including the norm “no ‘recognizing in a concept’ encouraged here.” 
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and judging that this is so. An analysis of what judging something beautiful means (the 
Analytic of the Beautiful), coupled with an explanatory theory of how the mind produces 
such judgments yields the above account.  
Though Kant and Nietzsche may share the notion of projecting design-like form 
into experience, one might argue that this at most makes Nietzsche an aesthetic 
subjectivist. Aesthetic subjectivism is such a common view that its alleged presence in 
Nietzsche would scarcely need explaining. What is distinctive about Kant’s aesthetics is 
his attempt to salvage an intersubjective validity to claims of taste despite the absence of 
objective aesthetic properties.  
Does Nietzsche even have any interest in the epistemological dimension of 
aesthetics, in justifying the validity of claims of taste? If Nietzsche was a pure 
subjectivist about aesthetic value, it is difficult to see how art could possess the 
importance Birth of Tragedy claims for it. Schopenhauer’s dogmatic-Platonic means of 
securing the objectivity of judgments of taste is unavailable to Nietzsche. Having painted 
himself into this corner, Nietzsche should have availed himself of a Kantian analysis of 
the beautiful, because there is no alternative.  
 How does this sit with the common view of Nietzsche as a champion of 
“perspectivism” and creative self-expression? First, “perspectivism” is really an issue for 
the late Nietzsche only. Birth of Tragedy wears its commitment to uniform standards of 
beauty on its sleeve. Second, throughout Birth of Tragedy, we see Nietzsche characterize 
the artist, not as expressing a personal, subjective experience, but as a vehicle through 
which a “primordial unity” [Ur-Eine] operates. That Nietzsche is explicitly concerned 
with vindicating the intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgments, however, only 
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becomes evident in his analysis of lyric poetry. 
Modern aesthetics, by way of interpretation, could only add that here the first 
“objective” artist confronts the first “subjective” artist. But this interpretation 
helps us little, because we know the subjective artist only as the poor artist, and 
throughout the entire range of art we demand first of all the conquest of the 
subjective . . .  indeed, we find it impossible to believe in any truly artistic 
production, however insignificant, if it is without objectivity, without pure 
contemplation devoid of interest [BT 5, ellipses and emphasis mine]. 6 
Nietzsche cannot regard aesthetic judgments as objective because this would commit him 
to independent aesthetic properties, and he has argued against this. But if he regarded 
aesthetic judgments as subjective, lyric poetry, an exemplar of subjective self-expression, 
would not be a counter-example requiring a special analysis. Nietzsche’s conception of 
the Apollinian is thus neither subjective nor objective. If it is not intersubjective, it is 
nothing. Therefore, Nietzsche’s conception of the Apollinian was most likely inspired by 
a reading of Kant’s “Analytic of the Beautiful.” 
 It is on Nietzsche’s phenomenology of the tragic that his early claim to have set 
himself apart from Schopenhauer is thought to rest. 7 However, it is often thought that 
                                                 
6In a footnote to his translation of this passage, Kaufmann, predictably, traces this claim to Schopenhauer, 
not Kant [p. 48, fn. 2]. It is true that Schopenhauer takes the notion of disinterested pleasure from Kant. 
Kant means by this “pleasure not due to preference-satisfaction,” a notion he then uses to secure the 
intersubjective validity of judgments of taste. Schopenhauer thinks he has no need to shore up the 
epistemological credentials of aesthetic judgments. Kant, however, would have found his reliance on 
Platonic Forms and our intuition of them entirely objectionable. Misunderstanding Kant, Schopenhhauer 
then transforms the notion of disinterested pleasure into the notion of “quieting of the will,” as if the plastic 
arts invariably had an anaesthetic effect. Nietzsche transparently opposes this claim about the arts. Though 
Nietzsche uses Kantian and Schopenhauerian formulae interchangeably here, his concern is with the 
epistemological credentials of an aesthetic judgment. This is a problem, given the idiosyncrasy of 
experience that lyric poetry expresses. 
 
7Note that the above already has impact on our interpretation of Nietzsche’s account of the tragic affect, 
since the tragic for Nietzsche is a synthesis of the Apollinian and Dionysian. 
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Nietzsche’s conception of the Dionysian is inspired by Schopenhauer’s explanation of the 
aesthetic effect of music in terms of its relation to the will as thing-in-itself. Yet 
Nietzsche is as skeptical of Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the 
will from the late 1860s to the mid-1870s as he is of the notion of Platonic Forms. This 
suggests that the key to the Dionysian, and hence the tragic, may lie, not with 
Schopenhauer’s analysis of music, but with Kant’s analysis of dynamical sublime. 
 For Schopenhauer, representations of tragic episodes reveal humanity’s basic 
condition, given the nature of the will and the destructive and pointless way that it 
expresses itself.8 Tragedy, then, simply shows us the empirical facts about the 
impossibility of attaining ordinary happiness. This induces in us resigned weariness 
anticipating the “denial of the will” upon which salvation depends. 
 Here, we must be quite careful, however, to note the limited role Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysics plays in his account of tragedy. Schopenhauer classes tragedy as a type of 
poetry, one among many plastic arts. He ascribes its effects to its presentation of the 
Platonic Form of human nature. The theory of the will only explains why human life is 
disappointing. The aesthetic effects of tragedy depend not, as in music, on some aesthetic 
mechanism essentially involving the metaphysics of the will. Instead, tragedy reports the 
simple fact that we suffer, and the more contentious claim that there is no way around 
this. The metaphysics of the will serves to explain why human beings suffer, but not why 
we take pleasure in tragedy. The pervasiveness of suffering can be adduced without 
recourse to metaphysics. Unlike Aristotle, Hegel or Nietzsche, Schopenhauer does not 
explain tragic affect at all. The question “why does tragic suffering in an artistic frame 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8WWR I, pp. 252-55. 
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please us when ordinary suffering outside the artistic frame does not” does not interest 
Schopenhauer. Given his account, the effects of tragedy ought to be more efficiently 
produced by watching crime reports or natural disasters on the nightly news. Being a 
victim oneself would be still more efficient. Tragedy, like life, is just plain unpleasant, 
but at least it promotes resignation. 9 
 Yet if we turn instead to Kant’s analysis of the dynamical sublime, we can see 
that it already resembles Nietzsche’s account of tragedy as “the sublime as the artistic 
taming of the horrible” [BT 7, emphasis Nietzsche’s]. Recall that the dynamical sublime 
is an experience in which we are exposed to events and images which would be 
dangerous if real. The effect of pleasure is due, in the first instance, to the presence of the 
artistic frame, which neutralizes the danger. In Nietzsche’s account of the tragic, there 
must also be an artistic frame. This is why the tragic involves the Apollinian as the 
representational form that the Dionysian experience must take. The Dionysian must be 
presented as a human character of beautiful form and also as the circumstances 
destroying her. This artistic frame of formal representation transforms staged events from 
dangers to objects of contemplation. 
 Furthermore, the dynamical sublime, like all aesthetic experiences for Kant, is 
ultimately pleasurable. Kant’s explanation for the peculiarly stern but thrilling quality of 
that pleasure was that hostile images which leave us unharmed put us into a state 
analogous to the state we are in when reason overcomes moral temptation. This in turn 
                                                 
9It is a commonplace that Schopenhauer’s theory is flawed by its inadequate account of tragic affect, this 
being Nietzsche’s central objection to it. The most unsatisfying aspect of his theory is that, despite his 
refusal to reduce tragedies to morality plays, the importance of tragedy for him is ultimately didactic: the 
right course of action is to give up acting. This confusion of moral with aesthetic aims seems entirely to be 
expected, given Schopenhauer’s dogmatic-Platonic account of aesthetic experience. 
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reminds us that as moral agents, we are not merely vulnerable phenomenal beings, but 
that we are also, as noumenal beings, ultimately indestructible. This is because the moral 
law demands the practical conclusion that we are free, and this is only possible if we are 
also noumenal. Thus scenes of destruction, paradoxically, evoke our own invulnerability. 
 Kant himself does not go beyond associating the dynamical sublime with our 
experience of nature, with its “bold, overhanging and, as it were, threatening rocks, 
thunderclouds piling up in the sky and moving about accompanied by lightening and 
thunderclaps, volcanoes with all their destructive power, hurricanes with all the 
devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean heaved up, the high waterfall of a 
mighty river” [CJ, Ak. V, p. 261]. However some of his brief remarks on the sublime 
might very well have suggested to Nietzsche that human activities and interactions could 
be sublime as well. This would set the stage for interpreting tragic affect as a species of 
the dynamical sublime. 
Even war has something sublime about it if it is carried on in an orderly way and 
with respect for the sanctity of the citizens’ rights. At the same time it makes the 
way of thinking of a people that carries it on in this way all the more sublime in 
proportion to the number of dangers in the face of which it courageously stood its 
ground. [CJ, Ak. V, pp. 262-63]. 
The passage from the dynamical sublime to the Nietzschean tragic, however, must take 
us through several intermediate stages.  
 First, human activities must be substituted for natural forces. It is no coincidence 
that so much of the plot material of tragic drama involves war and its side-effects. It is in 
organized destructiveness that human beings most closely approximate the 
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destructiveness of nature. Second, the neutralized danger the spectator feels must be 
displaced onto a represented figure--the tragic protagonist. Instead of framed images that, 
if real, would endanger the spectator, as with painted thunderstorms, the spectator 
identifies with the protagonist, who, within the frame, absorbs all the danger. 
Displacement now does the work of neutralizing the danger, but the tension between 
danger and its neutralization is itself intensified, as the spectator has a proxy inside the 
frame. Third, the protagonist must be synthesized by the spectator as a beautiful form; 
this is the Apollinian element that Nietzsche claims is essential to tragedy. It is here that 
Nietzsche’s theory is in debt to Schopenhauer’s remarks about tragedy presenting the 
Platonic Form of Humanity. We need not suppose that the experience involves intuiting 
Forms, any more than dreaming, to which Nietzsche often likens the Apollinian, involves 
contact with a dream world. The experience of the protagonist as satisfying to our taste, 
on a Kantian analysis, does not require any such ontological inflation.10 
 Naturally, our response to the destructiveness of the tragic cannot be precisely 
modeled on the account Kant gives of the dynamical sublime. There appears to be 
nothing in Nietzsche’s theory corresponding to the role Kant gives to practical reason. In 
Kant’s account, the combination of an image of danger, with the frame which neutralizes 
the danger, produces a state in us analogous to the overcoming of moral temptation. This 
reminds us that we are not only phenomenal but (because we are potentially moral), we 
are also noumenal beings, invulnerable to the vicissitudes of phenomenal life. 
                                                 
10Nietzsche often seems to think that a tragedy is more satisfying if the beautiful form and the destructive 
force are the same character, as in, e.g., Oedipus Rex. However the locus of destruction can be partially 
displaced away from the beautiful form, as it is in Othello. Othello’s destructiveness is dependent upon the 
destructiveness of Iago. In Richard III, our response to the protagonist approximates pure revulsion, while 
the beautiful forms, if any, must be sought in his eloquence or his victims. As this last suggestion regarding 
eloquence makes clear, the notion of form here is potentially a quite broad one. 
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 There is, however, an implied ethic in Birth of Tragedy: 
If we conceive of it at all as imperative and mandatory, this apotheosis of 
individuation knows but one law--the individual, i.e., the delimiting of the 
boundaries of the individual, measure in the Hellenic sense. Apollo, as ethical 
deity, exacts measure of his disciples, and, to be able to maintain it, he requires 
self-knowledge. And so, side by side with the aesthetic necessity for beauty, there 
occur the demands “know thyself” and “nothing in excess”; consequently 
overweening pride and excess are regarded as the truly hostile demons of the non-
Apollininan age... [BT 4]. 
Nietzsche shows no interest in Kantian ethics in his early phase, and almost all his 
discussions of it subsequently are hostile. However, Nietzsche had already entertained the 
idea that the Dionysian human being is “no longer artist, [but rather] has become a work 
of art...” [BT 1]. If we identify the Apollinian with Kantian beauty, section four implies 
that ethics is a matter of an imperative to give form to oneself.11  Given what we have 
already seen of Kant’s and Nietzsche’s aesthetics, this claim need not have the 
disturbingly arbitrary implications it would have for most current readers. For the 
standards would be those of Hellenic taste, vindicated by appeal to intersubjectively valid 
                                                 
11I am assuming that what early Nietzsche takes here to be ethics for the Greeks would be for Nietzsche 
ethics simpliciter.The ethics I am attributing to early Nietzsche is, in essence, Nehamas’ account of 
Nietzsche’s ethics, early and late; see Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. 142-234. My disagreement with Nehamas’ aestheticism is that I find it 
most clearly expressed and committed to only in the early writings. Since Nietzsche is here committed to 
intersubjectively valid standards of taste, such a form of aestheticism proves to involve a notion of 
constraining social norms. 
 Of course, such an ethics may still seem entirely unsatisfactory from a modern perspective. It 
would have to trace any requirements not to harm others to a prior requirement to self-restraint merely for 
the sake of giving the self a certain structure. We may not find such a view acceptable. Nietzsche is in good 




standards. Kant himself speaks of intersubjectively valid standards as creating a 
community of feeling, a sensus communis, which parallels or anticipates the standards of 
a moral community. Rather than reinforcing reason’s determinative moral standards, 
reflective judgments about the design of an agent’s character, based on the pleasure this 
design gives to impartial spectators, would replace determinative judgments of practical 
reason. Conduct would be judged by its attractiveness, rather than by its conformity to 
objective rules.12 
 However that may be, it is clear from the passage above that this activity of giving 
form to one’s own character involves imposing constraints on one’s desires. This, in turn, 
is sufficient to give Nietzsche access to a conception of the dynamical sublime 
resembling Kant’s, up to a point. When confronted with images of danger, our faculty of 
desire is initially mobilized to flee in terror, but for the aesthetic frame that neutralizes the 
danger and assures us of our safety. This feeling of standing fast against temptation 
produces an aesthetic state paralleling what we experience when we give form to our 
conduct in accord with intersubjectively valid standards. Such giving form also requires 
us to stand fast in the midst of temptation. Thus would a Nietzschean dynamical sublime 
bring us into awareness of our own power of self-restraint. 
 The Nietzschean tragic could very well be a variation on Kant’s dynamical 
sublime. Instead of the form-dissolving power of nature, we see the form-dissolving 
power of destructive human activities. Human beings are both the agents of the 
                                                 
12This analysis raises interesting questions about the role of agent intentions in ethical judgment; though the 
concept of intentional action would be involved, just as it is in other reflective judgments, the attribution of 
intention would drop out of ethical judgment, to be replaced by what the judge can’t help but feel was the 
“as if” intention. There are areas of moral judgment, however, where this may not be far from what we do 
(two possible examples are judgments of culpable negligence and judgments of general character). 
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destruction and the exemplars of the beautiful forms being destroyed. This in turn leads 
to an invigorating awareness of our own capacity to give form to our own characters. 
Should this interpretation be made plausible, the possibility must be broached that 
Nietzsche’s debt to the Critique of Judgment was even more extensive than previously 
realized, and that “the cadaverous perfume of Schopenhauer sticks only to a few 
formulas.” [EH, “Books,” BT:1]. 
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